Witryna"Naked Exclusion and Buyer Coordination," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1780, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. Rasmusen, Eric B & … WitrynaNaked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts. This paper reports the results of an experiment on exclusive contracts. We replicate the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000). Our….
Naked Exclusion with Private Offers - American Economic …
WitrynaVOL. 90 NO. I SEGAL AND WHINSTON: NAKED EXCLUSION, COMMENT 297 exclude profitably: discrimination allows the in-cumbent to successfully exploit the … Witrynathen a symmetric coordination game with multiple equilibria and exclusion occurs only if the buyers fail to coordinate on the (more efficient) rejection equilibrium. In this paper we examine whether sequential (discriminatory) contracting is more conducive to exclusion in the lab than simultaneous contracting. itsme recovery
THE CASE OF SEQUENTIAL CONTRACTING* - JSTOR
Witryna1 lut 2000 · Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley [American Economic Review 1991, henceforth RRW] have argued that an incumbent may in fact be able to exclude rivals profitably by exploiting buyers' lack of coordination. WitrynaIn the context of the naked exclusion model of Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991) and ... externalities, coordination, experiments. JEL classification: C91, L12, L42 1The third (second) [first] author acknowledges financial help from ... if buyers are approached sequentially, exclusion is achieved at negligible costs. The idea is that … WitrynaWe show that if buyers cannot observe each other's offers and have passive or wary out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the divide-and-conquer exclusion strategy fails. Equilibria in which the incumbent obtains exclusion due to a coordination failure, on the other hand, exist for all out-of-equilibrium beliefs. ... "Naked Exclusion with Private Offers ... its me power